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MECHANICS' LIENS IN NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR.*
In this article the North Carolina statutes concerning what are
commonly referred to as mechanics' liens will be summarized and
an analysis attempted of the interpretive decisions of state and
federal courts. The classification of these liens, including those of
contractors, subcontractors, mechanics and other laborers, skilled
or unskilled, materialmen, artisans, and loggers will be discussed with
a view to delineation and clarification. Jurisdictional matters, and
issues with respect to practice, procedure, and the admissibility of
evidence, will merit attention only when they have arisen in some
case concerning rights derived from or connected with the liens
conferred by these statutes.
I. BASIC MECHANIC'S LIEN ON REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
The North Carolina statute providing for the generally ap-
plicable mechanic's lien states that any property, whether real or
personal, and specifically including vessels, farms, buildings, and the
land upon which the structures are situated, is subject to liens for
all debts which may be incurred for work performed or material
furnished for the purpose of building, rebuilding, repairing, or im-
proving such property.
A. Who is Entitled to the Lien?
Issues often arise concerning the right of some person or class of
persons to claim a lien under this statute. Basically, the question
of who is entitled to the lien is determined by considerations of (1)
the type of services undertaken (2) the type materials furnished and
(3) the contractual relationship between the lienor and lienee. A
discussion of definitions and the court's interpretive analysis of. these
,three considerations will prove enlightening.
1. Services undertaken. One who furnishes labor or materials
directly to the owner in erecting or repairing a building cii enforce
such a lien upon the edifice.2 The same is true of a contractor who
* Research Fellow, University of North Carolina.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §44-1 (1950). "
' Boykin v. Logan, 203 N.C. 196, 165 S.E. 680 (1932); Isler.v. Dixon,
140 N.C. 529, 53 S.E. 348 (1906).
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makes an agreement to erect a building and obtains labor and mate-
rials from others at his own expense.' Mechanics would similarly be
clearly Within the scope of the statute. The term "mechanic" is
given a broad meaning and has been defined as being applicable to
laborers who work with their hands and are skilled in the utilization
of tools of common use.4
Outside the scope of the statute was the bookkeeper who made
a commitment to be "generally useful" under which he performed
certain manual duties.' There was also held to be no lien in favor
of one employed to superintend the erection of a building,' or one
hired to assist in purchasing mill machinery as well as to perform
other duties in connection with the erection and operation of a
factory.7 Furthermore, the court denied a lien under this statute to
one who hauled crossties from a swamp to railway operators who
afterwards purchased them from the owner.
8
To authorize a lien under the general lien statute, it would seem
to be necessary that there be some betterment to the property upon
which the labor is bestowed or the materials expended.
8
2. Materials furnished. Vendors of certain types of articles
and other persons seeking to assert materialmen's liens have been
denied the right to do so. The courts, for example, have refused
to classify as "materials" such articles as an engine for a gas boat,'
an architect's plans and specifications,"0 and electrical appliances
furnished to a power company where none of the appliances ever
became a part of the plant and the wires and transformers supplied
were merely strung on electric light poles." The tribunal in this
latter example used language which would seem to indicate that
'Lester v. Houston, 101 N.C. 605, 8 S.E. 366 (1888).
'Stephens v. Hicks, 156 N.C. 239, 72 S.E. 313 (1911).
Nash v. Southwick, 120 N.C. 459, 27 S.E. 127 (1897).
' Stephens v. Hicks, 156 N.C. 239, 72 S.E. 313 (1911).
' Cook v. Ross, 117 N.C. 193, 23 S.E. 252 (1895).
'Tedder v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R., 124 N.C. 342, 32 S.E. 714 (1899).
" Thomas v. Merrill, 169 N.C. 623, 627, 86 S.E. 593, 595 (1915);
Glazener v. Gloucester Lumber Co., 167 N.C. 676, 83 S.E. 696 (1914);
Tedder v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R., supra note 8. In the Tedder case the
court stated: "It seems, so far, that the Legislature has provided a lien only
when the service or labor is for the betterment of the property on which the
labor is bestowed. . . ." Id. at 345, 32 S.E. at 714.
The Pearl, 189 Fed. 540 (E.D.N.C. 1911).
10 Stephens v. Hicks, 156 N.C. 239, 72 S.E. 312 (1911).




articles perfect in themselves and not placed in a building in such a
manner as to lose their identity would not be considered as being
within the meaning of the term as employed in the statute.
3. Relationship between lienor and lienee. It is a generally ac-
cepted rule of law that the assignment of a debt carries with it the
security provided to guarantee its payment. Hence the assignment
of a valid claim for labor or materials will give the assignee the
right to file, perfect, and enforce a mechanic's lien."2
Although the statute does not so specify, the party seeking to
create a lien against a specific piece of property, in order to perfect
his lien, must have contracted with the owner or some other person
who has an interest in the property. If an alleged contract has been
entered into with a person other than the owner, there can be no
lien unless this party can be shown to have had some special interest
in the land, 3 or to have been properly authorized to make the agree-
ment upon which the encumbrance is based.' 4
A valid debt is necessary for the creation of a mechanic's lien,
and consequently one will not exist in favor of a person who, with-
out contract or authority, erects a building upon land belonging to
another.' 5 The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that this
general rule is not changed simply because there has been a mistake
in ownership caused by an abortive attempt to exchange two lots
which has fallen through for the reason that one of them was en-
cumbered by a mortgage. 16 Furthermore, the court has declared
1 Home-Wilson, Inc. v. Wiggins Bros., 203 N.C. 85, 161 S.E. 726
(1932) ; Blue Pearl Granite Co. v. Merchants Bank, 172 N.C. 354, 90 S.E.
312 (1916). The court in Horne-Wilson disagreed with what had been said
in Zachary v. Perry, 130 N.C. 289, 41 S.E. 533 (.1902) to the effect that
only the assignor, the original party to the contract, could enforce the lien.
In Horne-Wilson the court stated that the Zachary decision was irrelevant
because it involved a charge upon the estate of a married woman. The
court's statement in the Zachary case denying the assignee's right to enforce
the lien is unqualified, and it is difficult to perceive any reason why the in-
volvement of a married woman's estate should have had any bearing upon
the right of the assignee to enforce the lien. A more reasonable explanation
would seem to be that the court did not wish to admit that one of its former
members had made such an unsupportable assertion.
13 Baker v. Robbins, 119 N.C. 289, 25 S.E. 876 (1896) (contracting party
had an equity of redemption).
1, See Nicholson v. Nichols, 115 N.C. 200, 20 S.E. 294 (1894).
Thompson v. Taylor, 110 N.C. 70, 14 S.E. 513 (1892); Wilkie v. Bray,
71 N.C. 205 (1874).
" Honeycutt v. Kenilworth Dev. Co., 199 N.C. 373, 154 S.E. 628 (1930).
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that there can be no lien where the materials furnished were not
used in erecting the building upon which the lien was claimed.11
A somewhat similar situation develops where a husband and
wife hold an estate by the entirety. To entitle a laborer or material-
man to a lien upon real estate thus owned, it must appear that both
spouses have lawfully contracted the indebtedness out of which the
claim arose." Mere knowledge that the contracting spouse is making
improvements on the property cannot make the other spouse or the
property liable.' However, where the wife or husband has lawfully
contracted to become jointly responsible for the indebtedness for
which the lien is claimed, the property is subject to a lien.2" In Ranlo
Supply Co. V'. Clark"' the contract' for the purchase of materials was
negotiated by a son who was building a house on land held by his
parents as an estate by the eritirety. The materialman was held not
1 7Lanier v. Bell, 81 N.C. 337 (1879). The question as to whether there
would be an enforceable lien where such use was intended but not carried
out was raised but left, unanswered.
" General Air Conditioning Co. v. Douglass, 241 N.C. 170, 84 S.E.2d
828 (1954).
" Healey Ice Mach. Co. v. Grene, 191 Fed. 1004 (4th Cir. 1910).2 Finch v. Cecil, 170 N.C. 72, 86 S.E. 992 (1915). It is thought that
the following historical material would be of interest here. By N.C. Pub.
Laws 1911, ch. 109 married women were given full rights to contract. An-
other statute, N.C. Pub. Laws 1901, ch. 617, had made a married woman's
separate property subject to mechanics' liens. See Revisal § 2016 (1905).
For the general situation between 1901 and 1911 see Ball v. Paquin, 140
N.C. 83, 52 S.E. 410 (1905); Finger v. Hunter, 130 N.C. 529, 41 S.E. 890
(1902); Zachary v. Perry, 130 N.C. 289, 41 S.E. 533 (1902). No formal
contract of employment or sale was necessary. The lien was enforceable if
the married woman procured the material or gave her consent to its purchase.
Payne & Decker Bros. v. Flack, 152 N.C. 600, 68 S.E. 16 (1910). Revisal
§ 2107 (1905) provided that no contract between husband and wife affecting
her real estate would be valid unless it was in writing and formalized as re-
quired for conveyances of land, and unless it appeared to the official taking the
wife's private examination that the transaction was reasonable and not to her
disadvantage. There was a common-law presumption that a husband's im-
provements on his wife's land constituted a gift to her. In an instance where
a husband supplied labor and materials to erect a house on his wife's land
and then died, his administrator attempted to establish a mechanic's lien on
the property. The wife had executed a note about four years after work had
begun on the house, built by the husband over a period of several years, but
the court declared that the note and the circumstances surrounding its issu-
ance would not rebut the aforesaid presumption, since there was no evidence
to overcome a second presumption that the note had been executed under
the influence of the husband. Kearney v. Vann, 154 N.C. 311, 70 S.E. 747
(1911). For the law before 1901, see Weir v. Page, 109 N.C. 220, 13 S.E.
773 (1891) where a lien was denied despite evidence that the wife was aware
of the husband's contract, and had supported and approved the contract.21247 N.C. 762, 102 S.E.2d 257 (1958).
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to be entitled to enforce a lien upon such land ,unless an express or
implied obligation on the part of the parents could be shown. As
evidence of such an express or implied obligation it was shown that
a building and loan association, which had made the loan to fina-nce
the project for the son, issued one of its vouchers and made it pay-
able to the father, the contractor, and the materialman. The
voucher was endorsed by the father. and the contractor and delivered
to ihe materialman. The court ruled that the signing of the voucher
did not create the contractual relationship between the father and
the materialman necessary to give rise to a lien.' In another in-
stance a mortgage executed by both spouses upon property held as
an estate by the entirety contained a provision stating that any sum
which was paid by the mortgagee to satisfy prior liens would be
added to the indebtedness secured. A federal court held that this
provision would not be taken as an acknowledgment by the wife of
-a previously claimed lien on the property and that the recital would
not estop the wife to contest its validity.2"
Unless some agency agreement authorizing a lessee's improve-
ments can be established, the reversionary interest of the lessor can-
not be subjected to the liens of laborers and materialmen hired by
a contractor to erect a building for the lessee,24 and this is especially
true where the lessor's rights are reinforced by contract provisions.25
This principle was applied in Baker v. Robbins," where the owner
of an equity of redemption in a mortgaged steam sawmill had repairs
.made on a boiler without the consent or knowledge of the mortgagee.
Since no agency could be proven, it was held that the mechanic
would have an enforceable lien only upon the mortgagor's equity. In
Asheville Woodworking Co. v. Southwick 27 bar paraphernalia and
a counter did not become part of a rented building by being installed
2
,Of course there could have been no lien upon the property unless both
husband and wife were responsible.
"Henley Ice Mach. Co. v. Green, 191 Fed. 1004 (4th Cir. 1910). In
McGee v. Ledford, 238 N.C. 269, 77 S.E.2d 638 (1953), the owners of an
estate by the entirety repaired a jointly held dwelling. They were then di-
vorced, the husband conveying his interest in the real estate to his ex-wife.
A repairman who had properly filed a lien for labor and materials was held
to have an enforceable claim upon the property jn the hands of the defaulting
woman.24 Brown v. Ward, 221 N.C. 344, 20 S.E.2d 324 (1942).
" Weathers & Perry v. Cox, 159 N.C. 575, 76 .S.E. 7 (1912) ; Boone v.
Chatfield, 118 N.C. 916, 24 S.E.-745 (1896).
2. 119 N.C. 289, 25 S.E. "876 (1896).
" 119 N.C.'611, 26 S.E. 253 (1896).
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therein by the lessee. The fixtures did not pass to the lessor upon
the expiration of the lease but rather remained the property of the
lessee and hence subject to the claimant woodworking company's
mechanic's lien.
With respect to crops grown upon land which may be subjected
to enforcement proceedings under mechanics' liens, claimants who
have not perfected their liens before the crops are sold will lose any
claim they may have had thereto.2"
B. Enforcement of Lien
Contractors and those who supply labor or material directly
to the owner of an edifice being built or repaired may file their
liens, according to jurisdictional requirements to be discussed later,
with a justice of the peace or in the office of the clerk of the superior
court in the county where the property involved is situated. The
notice of the lien must be filed with the proper official within a period
of six months after the completion of the work or the final furnishing
of the material." There is a rule of law that the time for filing such
a lien will not be extended because some trivial portion of a contract
has not been performed. However, where an important item in a
construction job remains to be done the contractor will have the
statutory period, in this instance six months from the date of com-
pletion of the additional task, to file his lien. In one case the court
ruled it was a jury question whether a wire screen covering a sky-
light on top of a hotel built under contract was an important item
Harris v. Cheshire, 189 N.C. 219, 126 S.E. 593 (1925).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-38 (1950). A former statute, N.C. Pub. Law
1868-69, ch. 206, required that the lien be filed with the register of deeds, and
it was held that a claim filed in accordance with this former statute was
effective despite the change where the filing was otherwise in accordance with
the law. Chadbourn v. Williams, 71 N.C. 444 (1874). For practical applica-
tion of the present statute, see It re Fleetwood of Hendersonville Hotel Corp.,
1 F. Supp. 125 (W.D.N.C. 1932); Boykin v. Logan, 203 N.C. 196, 165 S.E.
680 (1932); Morganton Mfg. & Trading Co. v. Andrews, 165 N.C. 285, 81
S.E. 418 (1914).
3 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-39 (1950). A twelve month period was formerly
provided. Revisal § 2028 (1905). With respect to purchasers with no
notice of the encumbrance the period was reduced to six months by N.C.
Pub. Laws 1909, ch. 32. This amendment left the twelve month period still
in effect for purchasers with notice, and it was held that anyone claiming to
be without notice had the burden of proving the point. Raeford Lumber Co.
v. Rockfish Trading Co., 163 N.C. 314, 79 S.E. 627 (1913). An unqualified
six month period was adopted in 1913. N.C. Pub. Laws 1913, ch. 150.
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in a construction agreement and that a lien might be filed at any time
within six months of its delayed installation."
1. Jurisdiction. All claims against personal property exceeding
two hundred dollars, and all claims of whatever amount against real
property, are to be filed in the superior court. Claims against per-
sonal property of two hundred dollars and under are within the
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace.3 Difficult jurisdictional
problems may arise with respect to claims for the enforcement of
mechanic's lien based upon an indebtedness within the jurisdiction
of the justice of the peace.
Where a creditor's account consists of several items, either for
labor performed or material furnished on different occasions, the
value of each item amounting to less than two hundred dollars, a
justice of the peace may assume jurisdiction of any number of these
items not exceeding two hundred dollars, even though the total sum
of all the claims exceeds the jurisdictional limit of the justice. If,
however, the debt is an entire one, consisting of just one item, and
the sum exceeds the jurisdictional limitation for justices, the amount
cannot be divided or split-up in order that a justice may be allowed
to take the claim under consideration. Furthermore, consolidation
may be ordered where there has been a wanton or malicious effort
to bring multiple suits.3"
However, in some cases where the amount involved is less than
two hundred dollars and thus within the jurisdiction of the justice of
the peace, the superior court may nevertheless exercise its jurisdiction
over the case. Thus the superior court, in taking charge of the
entire estate of a debtor by means of a creditor's bill under its general
equity jurisdiction, has power to collect and dispose of all the debtor's
assets; to determine the validity of liens and all priorities which may
exist; to apply the collected funds accordingly, irrespective of the
8 Beaman v. Elizabeth City Hotel Corp., 202 N.C. 418, 163 S.E. 117
(1932). In Atlas Supply Co. v. McCurry, 199 N.C. 799, 156 S.E. 91 (1930)
the court held that the time of the final furnishing of materials might be
shown by introducing corporate records stating the dates on which materials
were sent forth to their destination.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-38 (1950). In an early case involving the estate
of a married woman who was indebted to a person who had furnished labor
and material to erect a house upon her property, it was decided that the action
to enforce a mechanic's lien for an amount less than two hundred dollars
must be brought before a justice of the peace. Smaw v. Cohen, 95 N.C. 85(1886).8Boyle v. Robbins, 71 N.C. 130 (1874).
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amount of any one claim; and to enforce mechanics' liens even though
the amount of the claim is less than two hundred dollars.8 4 In an
early case, moreover, where the proceeding was one to compel pay-
ment out of the estate of a married woman-an equitable remedy-
it was held that the superior court had jurisdiction even though the
amount of the asserted claim was less than the maximum juris-
dictional amount for a justice's court. The tribunal declared that a
justice of the peace has no equity jurisdiction. 5 It has also been
declared that the notice of a claim of a mechanic's lien for a sum
within the jurisdiction of a justice's court may be filed with the clerk
of the superior court and still be effective. It is only necessary that
the particular justice asked to enforce the lien have a copy of the
notice. 6
In one opinion the court stated that an action to foreclose a
mechanic's lien, being a proceeding in rem, is one in which jurisdic-
tion does not have to be acquired by actual attachment or seizure of
the property since the mere bringing of the suit in which relief is
sought is the equivalent of seizure.1T A few years later, however,
the court declared that a materialman's action to enforce a lien is not
an in rem proceeding, the indebtedness for which the lien is security
being a personal liability founded on contract.8" The statements in
the opinions seem incompatible. The better view would appear to
be that the proceeding would be in rem. There is a statement to this
effect in- a federal case39 involving a boat and a mechanic's lien
for supplies; however it is of little value as a precedent, since the
common form of proceeding in an admiralty court is in rem.
There is no legal requirement that an action to enforce a me-
chanic's lien must be brought in the county where the encumbered
property is located. However; in some situations the court has
allowed, as a matter of right, removal from the county of the plain-
tiff's residence to the county where the property involved is situated.
Thus where a claimant wishing to recover the balance due on a
contract for the construction of a church sought an order directing
3
'Fulp & Linville v. Kernersville Light & Power Co., 157 N.C. 157, 72
S.E. 867 (1911).
" Daugherty v. Sprinkle, 88 N.C. 300 (1883).
" Boyle v. Robbins, 71 N.C. 130 (1874).
Bernhardt v. Brown, 118 N.C. 701, 24 S.E. 527 (1896).
' Rutherford v. Ray, 147 N.C. 253, 61 S.E. 57 (1908).
"The Pearl, 189 Fed. 540 (E.D.N.C. 1911).
,' Sugg v. Pollard, 184 N.C. 494, 115 S.E. 153 (1922).
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the sale of church property under a properly perfected lien for labor
and materials, the church officials, after timely motion, were held
to be entitled as a matter of right to have the cause removed to county
in which the land was located and the lien first filed."
2. Procedure. The filing of a mechanic's lien for labor or mate-
rials entails more than mere delivery of notice to the office of the
proper official. The transcription of the written notice of the claim
to the lien docket and its proper indexing are essential. However, in
Saunders v. Woodhouse42 the filing of a mechanic's lien in a lien
docket established for old age assistance liens was said not to be
ineffective, for it was shown that all types of liens had for years
been filed in this docket rather than in the proper lien docket, the use
of which had been continuously neglected.
The statute specifically states that "all claims shall be filed in de-
tail, specifying the material furnished or labor performed and the time
thereof."4  However, while the statute demands more than a mere
summary statement, it does not require a listing of all material item
by item, or the labor performed hour by hour.4 4 The notice filed
must be sufficient in detail to put interested parties on notice as to
the labor performed and materials furnished, the time when the labor
was performed and the materials furnished, the amount due therefor,
and the property to which the lien might attach.45 In Fulp & Linville
v. Kernersville Light & Power Co.4" a notice of lien was deemed
sufficient where the entry on the docket stated the names of the lienor
" Penland v. Red Hill Methodist Church, 226 N.C. 171, 37 S.E.2d 177
(1946).12 243 N.C. 608, 91 S.E.2d 701 (1956).
'" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-38 (1950). The requirement of filing a detailed
statement of the claim is statutory. If the statement filed is defective due to
lack of detail, no lien arises. This defective statement cannot be cured by
an amendment in the superior court. In G. W. Jefferson & Bros. v. Bryant,
161 N.C. 404, 407, 77 S.E. 341, 342 (1913), the court stated: "If defective
[notice] when filed, it is no lien, and to permit an amendment, curing a fatal
defect, would be to confer upon the court the power to make a lien, and thus
destroy the provisions of the statute!'
" Cameron v. Consolidated Lumber Co., 118 N.C. 266, 24 S.E. 7 (1896).
In King v. Elliott, 197 N.C. 93, 147 S.E. 701 (1929), the court stated the
follpwing rule: "A distinction runs through the authorities in regard to the
particularity required in specifying the amount and character of the work
done or materials furnished, and the prices charged therefor, where the claim
rests upon open account and where the work done or materials furnished were
contracted for as an entirety. More particularity of statement is required in
the former than in the latter instance." Id. at 98, 147 S.E. at 704.
"Lowery v. Haitcock, 239 N.C. 67, 79 S.E.2d 204 (1953).
"157 N.C. 157, 72 S.E. 867 (1911).
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and lienee, the amount claimed, an accurate description of the
property to which the lien would attach, and the dates upon which or
between which materials were furnished, and further referred to
a schedule of prices and materials attached to the notice asking that
it be taken as a part of the notice of lien. It has also been deemed
proper to attach a bill of particulars to the notice filed reciting the
various items of labor and materials furnished, the price of each
item and the date furnished.47 Inconsistencies in the recitals recorded
would not necessarily be fatal, since the act of recording itself would
usually put anyone concerned upon further inquiry.4" Thus the lien
cannot be avoided because the notice of the claim states the claimant's
intention to apply it to two distinct lots separated by a street.40 In
determining the sufficiency of a claim as filed all portions of the
recorded notice must be construed together.50
With respect to liens filed under this general lien statute priorities
are determined according to the time of filing. 1 Thus an advantage
will accrue to those who file their liens without any excessive delay.
After the claim has been filed, an action to enforce the lien created
must be commenced in the proper court within six months from the
date of the filing of the claim. However, if the debt which has given
rise to the lien is not due within a period of six months, but will
become collectible within twelve months, proceedings to enforce the
lien may be initiated at any time within thirty days after maturity.52
3. Parties to enforcement proceedings. The various statutes deal-
ing with enforcement of mechanics' liens do not undertake to specify
who shall be made parties to the action to enforce the lien. The
nature and object of the action to enforce the lien must therefore be
King v. Elliott, 197 N.C. 93, 147 S.E. 701 (1929).
,8 Saunders v. Woodhouse, 243 N.C. 608, 91 S.E.2d 701 (1956).
Chadbourn v. Williams, 71 N.C. 444 (1874).9oKing v. Elliott, 197 N.C. 93, 147 S.E. 701 (1929).
"
1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-40 (1950).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-43 (Supp. 1961). While this and other statutes
of limitations applicable to mechanics' liens do not bind a federal court
attempting to enforce maritime liens, such statutes may be considered along
with other matters in determining whether a particular claimant, opposing
a bona fide purchaser of the vessel, has been guilty of laches. Davis v. The
Nola Dare, 157 F. Supp. 420 (E.D.N.C. 1957); Phelps v. The Cecelia Ann,
199 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1952). Whether there has been such laches is a
matter to be decided in each particular case after thorough consideration
of all the circumstances involved, including the lapse of time. Laches has
been said to exist in situations where no action was taken for a period of
more than two years. Phelps v. The Cecelia Ann, supra.
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considered. An owner of property upon which a contractor has
filed a mechanic's lien is a necessary party in an action to enforce
rights arising from the encumbrance. 3 Since a judgment in. the
enforcement action directly affects the owner's interest in the real
property involved, in that the property may be sold to satisfy the en-
cumbrance, such owner must be made a party to the action. The
holders of other encumbrances, such as mortgages and deeds of
trust, are not necessary parties but proper parties who, under
ordinary circumstances, may be permitted to intervene and have their
rights adjudicated in the lien proceeding. This procedure permits
the court to consider and decide all issues pertaining to the property
in one action, thus saving effort, time, and money."' However,
where no justiciable issue is involved because a judgment by default
has been rendered against the property owner, there would be no
privilege of intervention and holders of other encumbrances would
have to initiate an entirely new proceeding to have their rights ad-
judicated.5 Any such claimant who is not a party to the action
cannot be said to be bound by any decree which the court may
render.5
4. Sale of the Property. A judgment resulting from a contrac-
tor's successful effort to perfect his inchoate lien engenders a special
lien upon the building constructed and the lot whereon it stands, and
a general lien upon the owner's other property located in the county
where the judgment is docketed. But the building must be sold to
satisfy the judgment before resort may be had to the other property. 7
When a judgment has been recovered in a county other than the
one where the property is situated, it is necessary that it be trans-
ferred to the county wherein the property is situated in order to
enable the claimant to obtain a proper levy.- In one instance, where
the judgment had been transferred, the entry on the judgment docket
in the county of the situs failed to mention the type of lien involved,
though the judgment as filed had done so. The court ruled that
'2 Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Basnight, 234 N.C. 347, 67 S.E.2d 390
(1951).
" Childers v. Powell, 243 N.C. 711, 92 S.E.2d 65 (1956); Equitable Life
Assur. Soc'y v. Basnight, supra note 53.
Childers v. Powell, supra note 54.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Basnight, 234 N.C. 347, 67 S.E.2d 390
(1951).
" National Sur. Corp. v. Sharpe, 236 N.C. 35, 72 S.E.2d 109 (1952).
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the omission was immaterial and that it could not be used to defeat
a recovery.58
Sometimes a situation may arise where the amount of the in-
debtedness for which a mechanic's lien is claimed does not exhaust
the property being sold under judgment. In one instance a con-
tractor built a house on an undivided tract of land in a rural neighbor-
hood. The house was placed within the confines of a fence en-
closing approximately three acres of an eighty-acre tract. The
holder of a properly established mechanic's lien started proceedings
against the entire tract. It appeared that the house alone, apart
from the land, was of comparatively little value. The court decided
that there had been no segregation of the house from the land when
the fence was constructed. The lien was therefore on the entire tract.
But the court further stated that if it was both practicable and
desired by the owner, the land should be divided and the parts sold
separately in such order as the owner might elect, thus doing as
little damage to his interest as possible.59
C. Homestead Provisions
A state constitutional provision"0 makes the homestead exemption-
proof against every form of claim except taxes, purchase money
indebtedness, and the liens of mechanics and laborers.,- Under this
provision there can be no doubt that the homestead exemption will
not prevent real estate from being levied upon by officials acting
under properly perfected liens of mechanics or laborers. 2 Such is
not the case with the materialman's lien, however, and the constitu-
tional exemption protects the property against such a claim. 3 Where
the type of transaction involved makes a claim for labor and mate-
rials indivisible, the exemption will not prevent the execution of a
judgment for the whole amount. 4 An attempt by the legislature t6
make the lien for materials superior to. the exemption was ruled un-
constituiional. 5
Sugg v. Pollard, 184 N.C. 494, 115 S.E. 153 (1922).
Broyhill v. Gaither, 119 N.C. 443, 26 S.E. 31 (1896).
'N..2, CoNsr. art. X, § 4.
'See Cumming v. Bloodworth, 87 N.C. 83 (1882).
"Johnsonv. Leavitt, 188 N.C. 682,125 S.E. 490 (1924); Sugg v. Pollard,
184 N.C. 494, 115 S.E. 153 (1922). '
"' Cameron v. McDonald, 216 N.C. 712, 6 S.E.2d 497 (1940).
6' Stgg v. Pollard, 184 N.C. 494, 115 S.E. 153 (1922); Isler v. Dixon, 140
1;C- 529; 53 S.E. 348 (1906) ; Broyhill:v. Gaither, 119 N.C.' 443, 26 S.E.
31 (1896).




The liens created and established under the general mechanic's
lien statute are to be paid and settled according to the priority of
notice filed with the justice or the clerk.6" However, in determining
priority of claims when statutory mechanics' liens as well as other
types of encumbrances are involved, priority is not actually deter-
mined by the date of filing. The lien in favor of contractors, laborers,
and materialmen, created under the general mechanic's lien statute,
when properly filed, relates back to the moment when the initial labor
was performed or the first material furnished, and takes precedent
over subsequent encumbrances. Thus if an encumbrance attaches
to the property prior to the notice of the mechanic's lien, but sub-
sequent to the time when work was commenced or the materials
furnished, the contractor's, laborer's and materialman's lien, under
the theory of relation back, will have priority. 7 An assignment of
the property subject to a materialmen's claim will not prevent the
operation of this rule, even though no lien has been perfected nor
notice given before the transfer.6" A mortgage or deed of trust
registered prior to the initial furnishing of labor or material is
superior to a mechanic's lien69 and no lien will attach during the in-
stantaneous passage through the hands of the borrower in a purchase-
money mortgage transaction, even though subsequent to the initial
furnishing.70  However, a mechanic's lien will take precedence over
a deed of trust71 or a conveyance' made subsequent to the furnishing
but prior to the filing of the lien. Hence there can be no doubt that
the time of registration of a conveyance, mortgage, or deed of trust
is important in determining the priorities involved in any particular
situation. A mechanic's lien for labor and material completely
furnished after registration of a deed of trust has been held to be
inferior, even though the trustee acquired information leading him
66N.C. GEx. STAx. § 44-40 (1950).
"Equitable Life Asstir. Soc'y v. Basnight, 234 N.C. 347, 67 S.E.2d 390(1951); Sides v. Tidewell, 216 N.C. 480, 5 S.E.2d 316 (1939)*: Hairis '.
Cheshire, 189 N.C. 219, 126 S.E. 593 (1925); Burr v. Maultsby, 99 N.C. 263,
6 SE. 108 (1888).
"McNeal Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Howland, 111 N.C. 615, 16 S.E. 857.(1892).
Harrisxv. Cheshire, 189 N.C. 219, 126 S.E. 593 (1925).
. smith Builders Supply, Inc. v. Rivenbark, 231 N.C. 213, 56 S.E.2d 431:(1949).
.7' Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Basnight, 234 N.C. 347, 67 S.E.2d 390
(1951). " ..72Burr v. Maultsby, 99 N.C. 263, 6 S.E. 108 (1888).
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to believe that the owner had a contract with the lien claimant for
the construction of a building upon the property involved."3
If there are two sources or funds from which a mortgage in-
debtedness may.be.paid, such as the building and land upon which
labor and materials have been employed and personal property upon
which there is no mechanic's lien, the doctrine of marshaling is
applicable, and, the mortgagee can be forced to proceed against the
personalty in its entirety before the real estate can be seized, thus
leaving as much of the realty as possible to satisfy the holder of the
mechanic's lien. 4
II. SUBCONTRACTORS' LIENS-LIENS BY VIRTUE OF
NOTICE TO OWNER
North Carolina has a statute 5 authorizing liens in favor of sub-
contractors, laborers, and materialmen who are hired by a contractor
and perform work upon, or furnish materials for, any improvement
on real estate, when proper notification is given to the property owner.
TAis statute makes the lien conferred by its provisions superior to
the ordinary mechanic's lien. It requires every building contractor
to present to the owner of the edifice, before receiving any portion of
the agreed price as it may become due by the terms of the contract,
a list of every claim by laborers, artisans, or materialmen. This
statement must be itemized, and upon delivery to the owner requires
him to retain from sums due the contractor an amount not exceeding
the remaining portion of the price named by the contract and which
will be sufficient to pay the aggregate sum of the claims of the
laborers, artisans, and materialmen. The statute also authorizes the
owner to retain a sum agreed upon between himself and the con-
tractor as a guaranty for faithful performance, and this fund shall
be liable for any debts due to subcontractors, laborers, artisans, me-
" McAdams v. Piedmont Trust Co., 167 N.C. 494, 83 S.E. 623 (1914).
However, such liens are superior to an unregistered prior mortgage.
Dunavant v. Caldwell & No. R.R., 122 N.C. 999, 29 S.E. 837 (1898).
"'Harris v. Cheshire, 189 N.C. 219, 126 S.E. 593 (1925).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44-6 to -12. Soon after the enactment of the
general lien statute, it was held, in Wilkie v. Bray, 71 N.C. 205 (1874), that
no right to a lien was conferred by the statute unless there was a contract,
express or implied, with the owner .thereby creating the relation of creditor
and debtor. As a result of this decision, subcontractors were excluded from
its benefits, because they had no express contract with the owner, and none
could be implied from the mere use of the materials since they were fur-




chanics, or materialmen.7" Provision is also made for the sub-
contractors and others covered by the statute to make the initial move
and give notice of their claims to the owner ;7 thereafter the latter is
required to withhold enough, of the remaining, sum due the con-
tractor to satisfy the claims of those who have given notice. If the
owner after proper notification neglects to retain such funds, no pay-
ment of any sum to the contractor will operate as a discharge in
whole or in part of the indebtedness protected by the liens, and the
owner will be liable for the unpaid claims. The filing of the con-
tractor's statement operates in such a manner as to perfect the liens.78
The failure of the contractor to file the required statement, or the
contractor's refusal or neglect to apply funds paid to him by the
owner to the satisfaction of claims for labor or material, is made a
misdemeanor. " If at the time of notice the sum due the contractor
is insufficient to pay all the claimants in full, it is provided that the
distribution of the available funds shall be pro rata among those
claiming' a subcontractor's lien."0
Claims for work on railroads and vessels are specifically men-
tioned in this statute, and it is clear that persons supplying labor
or material for such construction projects would be entitled to liens
under its provisions. Furthermore, another statute8' gives lab orers
and materialmen employed by a railway construction contractor,
who is delinquent in meeting his obligations for thirty days, a right
to notify the railroad company and thereafter hold it liable for the
indebtedness. Such notice must be in writing and in detailed form.
It is required to be served on the railroad company within a period
of thirty days where labor is involved. 2
Where such a materialman supplying a subcontractor fails to avail
himself of the opportunity to give the owner the statutory notice,
he must develop any claim which he may have to funds due from
the owner or contractor through the subcontractor without any aid
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-8 (1950).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-9 (1950).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-10 (1950).
"N.C. GEx. STAT. § 44-12 (1950).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-11 (1950).
"
1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-13 (1950).
" A logging railroad of standard gauge whose tracks were moved about
according to operational convenience was held to be within the scope of this
enactment. Carter v. Coharie Lumber Co., 160 N.C. 8, 75 S.E. 1074 (1912).
The court declared that it would make no difference that at the time the
statute was enacted there were no logging railroads in the state.
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from or dependence upon the statute. In the case enunciating this
principle,"2a a contractor who by a construction agreement was en-
titled only to partial payments as the work progressed, employed a
subcontractor who consented to be solely responsible for all indebted-
ness incurred by himself. There was an agreement for installment
financing of the subcontractor's operation. The subcontractor had
been furnished with needed articles by two materialmen, neither of
whom had given the statutory notice to the owner. The sub-
contractor had given one of these materialmen an order upon the
contractor for a specified sum of money, and the order had been
accepted and the money paid. The other materialman claimed a
share of this payment and all other funds as payments were made
under the construction contract, contending that there should be
a pro rata distribution. After declaring that there could be no
statutory rights established in the absence of notice, the court said
that it was not unlawful for the contractor to accept the subcontrac-
tor's order upon the funds in his hands for the purpose of satisfying
the subcontractor's legitimate debts. It was stated that there was
no basis for a trust fund or pro rata distribution here.
One does not have to possess an entire and undivided interest in
material used in a construction job in order to be able to make a valid
claim under the statute. In one instance a shipment of lumber was
sent to contractors who used it in constructing a building. A portion
of the price for the lumber remained unpaid. A delivery to the
contractors was made by the holder of a carrier's bill of lading who
claimed to have paid a draft drawn by the shippers of the lumber.
This person asserted a claim against th6 building under construction.
The court-held that the claimant had a sufficient interest and was
entitled to enforce his rights under the statute.83
In one subcontractor's action to enforce claims against an owner's
property for labor performed, a trial judge instructed the jury that if
the owner had the benefit of the work and there were no unusual
circumstances demanding special treatment, the subcontractor should
then be permitted to recover the value of his services on a quantum
meruit basis. On appeal the court ruled that this instruction was
erroneous, since the usual quasi contractual rule would not apply in
proceedings of this sort because of the lack of contractual privity.
84
"a Hall v. Jones, 151 N.C.419, 66 S.E. 350 (1909).
" Lindsey v, Mitchell & McCauley, 174 N.C. 458, 93 S.E. 955 (1917).




The lien of a subcontractor, 'laborer, or materialman dealing with
a contractor is a creature of the statute and the right thereto is based
upon the required notice to the property owner.8 5 The notice which
will confer the lien must contain a written itemized statement specify-
ing in detail, the labor or materials furnished, the time such was
furnished, and the amount due and unpaid so as to put the owner
on notice that such an amount is demanded. 6  Mere knowledge of
the existence of the debt is not sufficient to charge the owner, and
the fact that a subcontractor is working on a building in the process
of construction, with the owner's knowledge, cannot be considered
notice imposing upon the owner any obligation s7 Thus where the
contractor, under the terms of his contract with the owner, furnished
statements and invoices showing the cost of labor and materials used,
it was held that there was not sufficient notice to the owner to give
rise to a lien in favor of the materialmen. 88 However, an itemized
statement of a building supplier's account for materials used by a con-
tractor in constructing a hospital, furnished the hospital officials by
the contractor on behalf of the claimant materialman, was held to be
sufficient notice of the claim to establish the materialman's lien.89
The claimant has the burden of proving that notice has been
given by himself or the contractor. °
The requirement that a subcontractor, laborer, or materialman
must file a proper notice with an owner in order to perfect a lien may
be waived." Thus the requirement that the notice to the owner
" Huske Hardware House v. Percival, 203 N.C. 6, 164 S.E. 334 (1932).
" Grier-Lowrance Constr. Co. v. Winston-Salem Journal Co., 198 N.C.
273, 151 S.E. 631 (1930).
" Clark v. Edwards, 119 N.C. 115, 25 S.E. 794 (1896).
8 Economy Pumps, Inc. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 220 N.C. 499, 17
S.E.2d 639 (1941).
" Norfolk Bldg. Supplies Co. v. Jones, 174 N.C. 57, 93 S.E. 440 (1917).
The notice must observe certain formalities, and a materialman's letter noti-
fying the owner that the writer was furnishing goods to the contractor has
been held to be insufficient, no itemized statement having been delivered there-
with. Huske Hardware House v. Percival, 203 N.C. 6, 164 S.E. 334 (1932).
'However a notice was held sufficient where it described the property upon
which the lien was being claimed, but referred to it as the property of a com-
pany rather than as that of an individual, it having been shown that he was
an individual operating a business and naming it a company. Porter v.
Case, 187 N.C. 629, 122 S.E. 483 (1924).
"Economy Pumps, Inc. -. F. W. Woolworth Co., 220 N.C. 499, 17
S.E.2d 639 (1941).
1 Goldston v. Randolph Mach. Tool Co., 245 N.C. 226, 95 S.E.?d 455(1956).
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should go into particulars regarding the varied transactions included
in a claim was deemed to have been waived where a female owner,
who had been given a cursory notice, wrote a fetter to the claimant
stating that in her opinion at the completion of the construction
project there would be approximately the amount of the claimant's
bill still due the contractor, that this was true despite the fact that
several other bills had been received, and that she would reserve the
claimant's bill for settlement.92 Moreover, an owner was held to
have waived any objection to the sufficiency of such a statement by
accepting it and making a payment thereon. 3 It has also been held
that where an owner, after notice, wrote a claimant that funds
sufficient to pay the indebtedness would be retained, it would be
deemed that there had been a waiver of the owner's right to deny
that materials furnished by the claimant had been used in the
building operation.94 In the absence of waiver it is clear there can
be no lien where there is a complete failure to give any notice to the
owner.
95
In actions pursuant to proper filing with an owner by sub-
contractors, laborers, or materialmen there is no necessity for
filing claims with the clerk of the superior court or a justice of the
peace within a period of six months as is required by the general
lien statute covering claims by contractors and others dealing directly
with owners.96
The giving of proper notification to the owner is without question
a prerequisite to the establishment of the lien. There is a further
requirement that the lien will be lost if an action is not begun within
six months of acquisition of the lien.97 However, while the lien may
be lost by failure to initiate the action within the six month period,
the subcontractor may still maintain an action against the owner
personaily.98
92 Bain v. Lamb, 167 N.C. 304, 83 S.E. 466 (1914).
"Norfolk Bldg. Supplies Co. v. Jones, 174 N.C. 57, 93 S.E. 440 (1917).
"Bain v. Lamb, 167 N.C. 304, 83 S.E. 466 (1914).
"Pinkston v. Young, 104 N.C. 102, 10 S.E. 133 (1889).
"Porter v. Case, 187 N.C. 629, 122 S.E. 483 (1924) ; Campbell v. Hall,
187 N.C. 464, 121 S.E. 761 (1924).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §44-43 (Supp. 1961).
"Campbell v. Hall, 187 N.C. 464, 121 S.E. 761 (1924) ; Grier-Lowrance
Constr. Co. v. Winston-Salem Journal Co., 198 N.C. 273, 151 S.E. 631(1930). In Porter v. Case, 187 N.C. 629, 122 S.E. 483 (1924), the court
stated: "The lien. is lost by an action not being commenced within six months
after notice by the subcontractor to the owner, but the statutory right to site
the owner is not barred. The owner under the statute is bound to account
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In one instance where neither the contractor nor the subcontrac-
tor had. given the required notice to the owner, it was declared that
the contractor would be allowed to maintain an action on the contract
in his own name and recover, as an element of damages, the cost
of the labor and materials supplied by the subcontractor. 9  This
case must be contrasted with an earlier decision °. to the effect that
a contractor may not sue in his own name, to the use of materialmen,
in an attempt to set himself up as the trustee of an express trust
within the purview of the real party in interest statute'0 ' which
authorizes such a trustee to sue without joining the persons for
whose benefit the action is initiated. The court declared that the
basis for such a proceeding could not be established by mere proof
of authority on the part of the contractor to collect the claims of the
materialmen, nor by proof that he furnished the owner written state-
ments with respect to the amounts due. It was said that no action
of this type was authorized and that a judgment of non-suit had been
properly rendered.
B. Priorities
It is provided by statute that those having filed proper notice with
the owner, and thereby establishing a lien, shall share pro rata in
the distribution of the funds.0 2 This method of pro rata distribution
differs greatly from the priority method set up by the general lien
statute. 0 3 It should be noted that the doctrine of relation back is
applicable, to a limited degree, to a subcontractor's lien. The lien
arises as soon as notice is filed. As among themselves, subcontractors
share pro rata, without regard to the date when the notice was first
filed or the material furnished. But the lien will relate back to the
date when the material or labor was first performed, in so far as
to the subcontractor for what he may owe the original contractor if notice is
given before payment to the contractor." Id. at 639, 122 S.E. at 488. This
rule thus avoids the problem of privity of contract and allows the sub-
contractor to sue the owner in a personal action without the joinder of the
contractor.
o Grier-Lowrance Constr. Co. v. Winston-Salem Journal Co., supra note
98.
Perry v. Swanner, 150 N.C. 141, 63 S.E. 611 (1909).
101 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-63 (1953).
102 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-11 (1950). In Morganton Mfg. & Trading Co.
v. Andrews, 165 N.C. 285, 81 S.E. 418 (1914), the court held that there was
no conflict with the provision of G.S. § 44-40 which provides for priority
based upon filing date in the case of a general mechanic's lien.
'03 See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
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other encumbrances (e.g. mortgages) are concerned.10 4 The sub-
contractor's lien statute also provides that the lien shall be "pre-
ferred to the mechanic's lien now provided by law" thus eliminating
any priority problems which might arise as to liens created under
the general lien statute.
When proper notice has been given an owner, either by the
required statement of the contractor or through the action of the
claimants themselves, all sums which may be due the contractor from
the owner under the construction contract become a trust fund for
the joint benefit of every subcontractor, laborer, and materialman
of whom the owner has been made cognizant.'0 5 Where this trust
fund is not sufficient to satisfy all the claimants, each of them is
entitled only to a pro rata share.'0 6 The rule is that only those
claimants who have given notice to the owner are entitled to share
in the distribution. However this may be changed by agreement of
the parties. Thus in West v. Laughinghouse'0° there was by agree-
ment pro rata distribution of the funds even though some of the
claimants had not properly perfected their rights by giving notice
to the owner. Sometimes a materialman or other claimant, in addi-
tion to filing a notice with the owner and thereby establishing a lien,
will also file a lien with the clerk of the superior court or a justice
of the peace, pursuant to G.S. § 44-1 in an attempt to obtain a
priority. In one such case,' the claimant, a materialman furnishing
a subcontractor, sought to establish a preference in this manner over
the other claimants who had also given the required notice to
the owner. The Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld a decision
that a pro rata distribution was proper. It was declared that the
statute giving an advantage to early filers was part of an enactment
concerning contractors, laborers, and materialmen dealing directly
with owners. The rights of subcontractors and other laborers and
materialmen transacting business with contractors were said to be
104 Lookout Lumber Co. v. Mansion Hotel & Belt Ry., 109 N.C. 658, 14
S.E. 35 (1891).10 Thomas H. Briggs & Sons, Inc. v. Allen, 207 N.C. 10, 175 S.E. 838(1934); Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Southern Aluminum Co., 172 N.C.
704, 90 S.E. 923 (1916).1
.Hildebrand v. Vanderbilt, 147 N.C. 639, 61 S.E. 620 (1908). Char-
lotte Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Southern Aluminum Co., supra note 105.
" 174 N.C. 214, 93 S.E. 719 (1917).




governed by G.S. § 44-8, specifically delineating their rights and
duties and providing for pro rata distribution.
C. Independent Contractor or Agent Problem
In some cases a claimant may honestly be in doubt as to whether
he,occupies the position of a subcontractor or a contractor. If a
materialman furnishes building materials to an independent con-
tractor, then the materialman is a subcontractor and is entitled to
assert his lien only under G.S. § 44-6 by giving notice to the owner.
However, if the materials are supplied to one who turns out to be an
agent or employee of the owner, then the materialman will be, in
effect, dealing directly with the owner and hence entitled to establish
his lien under the general lien statute. Thus the type of lien the
materialman may be entitled to will depend upon the status of the
person to whom he furnishes the material. Thus it would be wise for
all claimants to consider carefully the true relationship between the
owner and the person with whom they are dealing.
In one instance'09 an action was brought by a claimant against
both the owner and the person with whom the latter had direct
dealings. The owner claimed that this person was an independent
contractor and not an agent as asserted by the claimant. The lower
court rendered a default judgment against the alleged agent and
ordered that the case against the owner be tried on the issues raised
by the pleadings. On appeal, the court held that this action was not
determinative of the status of the parties and could not be looked upon
as an election to hold the alleged agent exclusively responsible. It
was said that, in this instance, there could be no election until the
issues involving the identity of the relationship between the parties,
raised by the owner, had been established. The court also noted
that the materialman need not know, at the time of the furnishing
of the materials, that the person to whom he furnishes the materials is
in fact an agent of the owner, in order to claim a lien against the
owner. The owner was in effect an undisclosed principal, and hence
the materialman may hold the owner liable under the doctrine that
an undisclosed principal may be bound by the simple executory
contracts of the agent, made for his benefit, when he is afterwards
discovered to be such." 0
... North Carolina Lumber Co. v. Spear Motor Co., 192 N.C. 377, 135
S.E. 115 (1926).
11 See also, Carolina Hardware Co. v. Raleigh Banking & Trust Co.,
169 N.C. 744, 86 S.E. 706 (1915).
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. Where a claimant elects to file notice with the owner upon the
theory that the material sold has been furnished to an independent
contractor, he is deemed to have elected the theory upon which he
wishes to proceed and he cannot afterwards assert that the material
has been sold directly to the owner."" Thus in Doggett Lumber Co.
v. Perry,"2 the plaintiff furnished materials for the construction of
a house. He elected to call himself a subcontractor and gave notice
to the owner of his claim against the contractor for lumber furnished.
Thus a lien was created by virtue of G.S. § 44-6. The plaintiff then
learned that the amount still due from the owner to the contractor-
the limit on the value of his lien-was not enough to cover his claim.
The plaintiff sought to establish a lien under the general lien statute,
as a materialman furnishing directly to the owner. The court held
that having elected to file notice of a lien as a subcontractor, the
plaintiff was estopped from asserting a lien under the general lien
statute.
D. State of Account Between Owner and Contractor
By statute, it is expressly provided that the total of all liens due
subcontractors and materialmen shall not exceed the amount still
due the original contractor from the owner at the time of the filing
of notice."3 Thus there is clearly no liability under the statute pro-
viding for notice to the owner, where there has been a failure on the
part of the claimant to file notice at a time prior to full payment by
the owner to the contractor." 4  The true amount which can be
collected is determined by the state of the account between the owner
and the contractor and not that between the contractor and the sub-
contractor or materialman."15 Further, failure on the part of the
claimant to allege that a balance on the agreed contract price between
the owner and the contractor is due makes a complaint demurrable."'
'll Economy Pumps, Inc. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 220 N.C. 499, 17
S.E.2d 639 (1941).
112 212 N.C. 713, 194 S.E. 475 (1930), petition for rehearing denied, 213
N.C. 533, 196 S.E. 831 (1938).3  N.C. GEx. STAT. § 44-6 (1950).
... Dixon v. Ipock, 212 N.C. 363, 193 S.E. 392 (1937) ; Brown v. Burling-
ton Hotel Corp., 202 N.C. 82, 161 S.E. 735 (1932) ; Pearce-Young-Angel Co.
v. Sternberg, 199 N.C. 21, 153 S.E. 629 (1930); Orinoco Supply Co. v.
Masonic & E. Star Home, 163 N.C. 513, 79 S.E. 964 (1913); Wood v.
Atlantic & N.C.R.R., 131 N.C. 48, 42 S.E. 462 (1902).
"' Atlas Powder Co. v. Denton, 176 N.C. 426, 97 S.E. 372 (1918);
Powell & Powell v. King Lumber Co., 168 N.C. 632, 84 S.E. 1032 (1915).
"" Dixon v. Ipock, 212 N.C. 363, 193 S.E. 392 (1937).
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Of course there can be no valid claim against the owner in any situa-
tion where the contractor is paid in advance.117
After notice, the owner cannot avoid liability by showing that
the contractor has been paid for all work done prior to the filing of
the claim, since if the contractor continues the work and receives
additional sums under the agreement, the claim can. be enforced
against the property to an amount equal to the sums subsequently
earned i1
The owner who seeks to avoid liability by showing that nothing
is due the contractor for work done prior to the filing of the notice
of the lien, has the burden of proving payment. In one instance,
however, this burden was not sustained by proof of the delivery
of a cashier's check which the drawee bank refused to accept for
payment." 9 The court, referring to an analogous decision,'
declared that the claim would not have been enforceable if there had
been an agreement to accept the check in full payment.
An effort to establish a claim is doomed to failure where there
has been an abandonment of the project by the contractor before
notice is given to the owner and it is established that there is no
further sum due on the contract price.'21 For instance, in Parsley
v. David, 2 there was evidence that after the owner and the con-
tractor cancelled the contract the owner paid claims by others for
labor and materials which had been furnished in furtherance of the
project. These payments were made directly to other claimants and
not through the contractor. The court ruled that they were made
on the owner's sole responsibility, and that after the cancellation there
remained no liability to the contractor and hence no basis for a valid
materialmen's claim. A similar result was intimated where the
contractor erected a building of such defective material and in such
an unworkman-like manner as to render it unfit for use by the owner.
The owner successfully claimed that she was damaged to such an
" 'Rose v. Davis, 188 N.C. 355, 124 S.E. 576 (1924).
11 Blue Pearl Granite Co. v. Merchants Bank, 172 N.C. 354, 90 S.E. 312
(1916).
"'oAndrews-Cooper Lumber Co. v. Hayworth, 205 N.C. 585, 172 S.E.
194 (1934).
10 South v. Sisk, 205 N.C. 655, 172 S.E. 193 (1934).
1 Roberts & Johnson Lumber Co. v. Horton, 232 N.C. 419, 61 S.E.2d
100 (1950); Piedmont Elec. Co. v. Vance Plumbing & Elec. Co., 197 N.C.
495, 149 S.E. 858 (1929).122 106 N.C. 225, 10 S.E. 1028 (1890).
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extent that no liability to the contractor existed. The court declared
that the owner might set up as a defense any actual damages caused
by the contractor and show that there was no liability on her part,
thus avoiding the claim. 2 '
Hence it may be said that it is clear that in any situation where
uncontroverted testimony demonstrates that, at the time a claimant
kives the required notice, the contractor has been paid everything
that is due him according to the terms of the agreement, the claim
iS'not enforceable against the owner's property.
24
As was previously discussed, 2 ' when the debt for which the
claim of the complaining laborer or materialman is being pressed
has been contracted for by an agent of the owner, the owner is pri-
marily liable. In this situation the rule that the owner would not be
liable unless something was due the contractor would not be ap-
plicable. 26 But a different result would follow where the material-
man's agreement is with an independent contractor employed by the
owner. Here the liability of the owner, after notice, extends only
to the unpaid balance due the contractor.
27
The claim of a materialman contracting with a subcontractor has
been said to be enforceable against any sum which may be due from
the owner of a building under construction to the general contractor
at the time notice was filed, or which may be subsequently earned
under the agreement, and there can be no doubt that the claim is
valid, regardless of the state of the account between the contractor
and the subcontractor. However, there is no personal liability on
t4he part of the contractor to the materialman unless it is established
that he has been guilty of some breach of duty, under the statute,
vorking to the claimant's prejudice, or an agency of purchase render-
ing him personally responsible has been established. 28
. Widenhouse v. Russ, 234 N.C. 382, 67 S.E.2d 287 (1951).
"' In one such instance involving the claim of a subcontractor it was held
to be error for a trial judge to refuse to charge that, if the jury believed the
evidence of total payment, there wouldz.theri be no liability to the. sub-
eontractor on the part" of the owner. Wood v. Atlantic & N.C.R.R., 131
N.C. 48, 42 S.E. 462 (1902).
See text, C. Independenr Contractor or Agent Problem, supra.
... Love v. Snellings, 246 N.C. 674, 100 S.E.2d 65 (1957); North Carolina
Lumber Co. v Spear Motor Co., 192 N.C. 377,135 S.E. 115 (1926). .
. "Economy Pumps, 'Inc. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 220 N.C. 499, 17
S.E.2d 639 (1941).
... Borden Brick & Tile Co. v. Pulley, 168 N.C. 371, 84 S.E. 513 (1915).
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E. Waiver of Lien
Sometimes there may arise an issue as to whether the claim
of some laborer or materialman has been waived. In one such case'
a lot owner who was an officer of a corporation to which a con-
tractor owed a pre-existing debt ,entered into an agreement with
the contractor to have a house built upon the land. The contract
contained a provision obligating the contractor to pay the pre-existing
indebtedness out of the agreed price. The contractor obtained a
waiver of the claim of a materialman, who asserted that the waiver
had been obtained by fraud, an allegation which was not denied by
the contractor and which therefore, for the purposes of this action,
must be taken as uncontroverted. Among issues tendered at the trial
was one involving the alleged fraud in inducing the waiver. The
refusal of the trial judge to submit this and other issues to the
jury was held to necessitate an order for a new trial. In discussing
the case the court stated that the materialman would not be permitted
to recover against either the owner or the corporation unless there
was an allegation and competent evidence that these defendants had
participated in the fraud or had ratified the contractor's conduct.
It was declared that under the circumstances here presented the effect
of a valid waiver of an established claim would be to remit the
materialman to a right to participate in the distribution of any funds
which might remain in the hands of the owner after notice.
F. Federal Tax Liens and the Subcontractor's Lien
It is clear that a federal tax lien has priority over a statutory
mechanic's lien which has not been reduced to judgment, even though
the lien was perfected by giving the proper notice prior to the
time the federal tax claim arose-.30 The mechanic's lien is not one
of those preferred interests to which the Congress has extended
priority over the federal tax lien.' 3' Further, if the owner rather than
the general contractor has been a delinqudnt taxpayer, the federal tax
lien reaching, all of the owner's property would prevail over the
claims of subcontractors, even though the subcontractor's claims are
protected with-perfected mechanic's liens.-
However, the rights of subcontractors and other claimants,. con-
Home Bldg., Inc. v. Nash, 200 N.C. 430, 157 S.E. 134 (1931).
"'United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956),
. See-INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6323.
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ferred by the statute delineating their rights against an owner, are
not to be extinguished by the seizure, under a government tax lien
upon the property of the contractor employing them, of funds still in
the hands of the owner and payable to the contract or under the
construction agreement. Subcontractors in a situation of this kind
are said to be entitled to. full payment of their claims. Thus in
United States v. Durham Lumber Co.' in a bankruptcy proceeding,
the United States sought to enforce a tax lien on certain accounts
owed the bankrupt contractor by the owner of the property, for work
done on the owner's realty pursuant to a contract. A subcontractor,
who had not been paid, notified the owner of his claim, thereby
establishing his lien. The notification by the subcontractor was
subseqluent to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. The Court
held that the subcontractor's claim was superior to that of the federal
tax lien. The rationale of the holding was that the federal tax lien
could attach only to funds which belonged to the bankrupt con-
tractor, and the contractor was entitled only to that which remained
after the subcontractor's claims had been paid. The contractor was
entitled to that part of the unpaid contract price which remains after
the subcontractors have had their claims paid. Thus the United
States was not entitled to that which did not belong to the contractor
but rather belonged to the subcontractor.
13 3
G. Liens Against Public Property
At one time no property publicly owned was subject to the liens
of laborers, materialmen, contractors, or subcontractors, whether
the claims were made under the general mechanic's lien law'3 4 or
under the statute making the claim enforceable upon notice to the
owner.' 35 Into the category of publicly owned facilities, not subject
to mechanics' liens, were put public schoolhouses,' county homes,' 87
sewer systems, power plants, and waterworks,' and no doubt
257 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1958).
'It should be noted that this problem has not yet been adjudicated by the
Supreme Court of the United States.
.' See Morganton Hardware Co. v. Morganton Graded School, 151 N.C.
507, 66 S.E. 583 (1909).
... Hutchinson v. Board of Comm'rs, 172 N.C. 844, 90 S.E. 892 (1916).
"88 Morganton Hardware Co. v. Morganton Grade School, 150 N.C. 680,
64 S.E. 764 (1909).
.. Hutchinson v. Board of Comm'rs, 172 N.C. 741, 90 S.E. 892 (1916).
..
8J. S. Schofield's Sons Co. v. Bacon, 191 N.C. 253, 131 S.E. 659 (1926).
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edifices like courthouses and jails as well,' 9 However, the lien was
held to be applicable to property transferred to and owned by a corpo-
ration chartered for the purpose of supplying water to a city.140
The non-application of these statutes to publicly owned property
often made it difficult for laborers and materialmen making agree-
ments with contractors constructing or repairing state or municipally
owned edifices to protect themselves.. In 1913 a statute14- was enacted
commanding municipal corporations negotiating contracts in excess
of five hundred dollars to require a contractor's bond conditioned
upon faithful payment of all claims for labor and materials, the bond
to have one or more sureties and its amount to be calculated on the
basis of a stated percentage varying with the sum to be paid the
contractor for the entire job. A laborer or materialman is author-
ized to sue on the bond whether his contract be with the contractor or
a subcontractor. Only one action may be brought on the bond, the
creditor who initiates the proceeding being required to notify all
persons concerned of the pendency of the action 'and to make publica-
tion as outlined in the statute. Anyone having a claim is given the
right to intervene at any time within a period of six months from
the day the proceeding is begun. A pro rata distribution is- decreed
for all claimants. A failure on the part of municipal officials to require
a contractor to furnish a proper bond constitutes a misdemeanor.
Under this legislation there can be no doubt that all interested
claimants, whether they be subcontractors, laborers, or materialmen,
may sue the surety on the bond if the contractor has failed to meet
his obligations. 4 '
This statute concerning municipal responsibility has been held
to confer upon subcontractors, laborers, or materialmen no right to
have funds withheld from the contractor to satisfy their unpaid
claims, their proper remedy being an action on the bond. In Robin-
son Mfg. Co. v. Blaylock.43 it was the opinion of the court that the
rights of these people, or those of the surety who has become re-
1' See Morganton Hardware Co. v. Morganton Graded School, 151 N.C.
507, 66 S.E. 583 (1909).1
"McNeal Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Howland, 111 N.C. 615, 16 S.E. 857
(1892).
.. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-14 (1950).
142 Scheflow v. Pierce, 176 N.C. 91, 97 S.E. 167 (1918). See also Town
of Gastonia v. McEntee-Peterson Eng'r Co., 131 N.C. 363, 42 S.E. 858
(1902).
148 192 N.C. 407, 135 S.E. 136 (1926).
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sponsible for paying their claims, to any percentage of the contract
price retained by the municipality as agreed upon must rest on the
particular contract involved in each case. In the instant controversy
a surety company, after default by the contractor, paid the entire
sum required by an inadequate bond, and the money was used to pay
some of the claims of subcontractors and merchants supplying labor
and material to the contractor. Unsatisfied claimants brought an
action against municipal officials, attempting to have the reserved
percentage applied to the satisfaction of the contractor's indebtedness
to them. The surety company, a party to the action, also claimed
that it was entitled to this reserved percentage. The court declared
that the surety would have no right of subrogation here, there having
been only a partial satisfaction of the contractor's indebtedness and
equitable principles demanding total payment to justify the invocation
of the doctrine. However, under circumstances like those presented
in this case the surety was said to have a right growing out of the
contractual relationship of the parties to have the reserved percentage
applied in exoneration of its loss sustained because of the failure of
the contractor to meet his obligations. The court deplored the in-
adequacy of the bond but evidently believed it could do nothing to
alleviate the plight of the unpaid claimants.
H. Contractor's Bond
It is standard procedure for property owners undertaking im-
portant building projects to require of the contractor making the
lowest bid a bond with proper sureties. The usual bond is condi-
tioned upon a faithful performance on the part of the contractor
and commonly makes provision for the payment of debts which the
contractor either cannot or will not pay.144 These bonds are usually
executed by surety companies and frequently can be said to be ex-
pressly or impliedly applicable to the satisfaction of the claims of
subcontractors, laborers, or materialmen. Such claimants are classi-
fied as beneficiaries and will be permitted to recover on the bond.145
... Even if the surety bond is a "performance" bond (rather than a "pay-
ment" bond) if the contract between the owner and the prime contractor re-
quires the contractor to pay laborers and materialmen, the performance bond
is deemed to cover the liability of the surety to the materialmen or sub-
contractors by reading the bond and the contract together. See North Caro-
lina Natural Gas Corp. v. Seaboard Sur. Corp., 284 F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1960).
X"Dixon v. Home, 180 N.C. 585, 105 S.E. 270 (1920) ; Guilford Lumber
Mfg. Co. v. Johnson, 177 N.C. 44, 97 S.E. 732 (1919); Orinoco Supply Co.
v. Shaw Bros. Lumber Co., 160 N.C. 428, 76 S.E. 273 (1912).
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It would not matter that the claimants were not generally or spe-
cifically named in the bond' 46 Neither would it matter that at the
time suit was brought there has been no pecuniary damage to the
owner, the rule which requires such a loss being inoperative where
the bond, in addition to guaranteeing faithful performance and agree-
ing to save the owner harmless, provides for the discharge of some
obligation, in this case the payment of laborers and materialmen.
147
Furthermore, a materialman will not be prevented from recovery
on the bond because he is neither a party to the agreement nor privy
to the consideration." 8 It is clearly incumbent upon a claimant who
has furnished material to allege and prove the indebtedness due from
the contractor, as the surety's liability on the bond grows out of and
is dependent upon the contract executed by the principal, who must
be guilty of some default before the secondary responsibility will
arise. 49 A materialman suing as a beneficiary of a bonding contract
between a contractor and his surety is subject to all legal and equi-
table defenses, and hence fraud in the treaty with respect to the
surety contract can be used to avoid liability thereon. 5 ' In Morgan-
ton Mfg. & Trading Co. v. Andrews 5 ' a contract for the con-
struction of a building provided that the contractor would perform
the work and furnish all materials. The bonding agreement with a
surety company provided that it would be responsible to the owner
alone, and that he, in estimating the damages resulting from some
breach of the building contract, might include the claims of me-
chanics and materialmen arising out of the performance of the con-
tract, and to be paid for by the owner, only when the claims were
valid liens against the property by virtue of state legislation. Unpaid
furnishers of material who had not perfected liens brought suit,
claiming that the surety bond covered this indebtedness incurred by
the contractor. The contention of these creditors was that the
construction agreement was a contract to build and furnish labor
1 Dixon v. Home, supra note 145.
1
'
7Orinoco Supply Co. v. Shaw Bros. Lumber Co., 160 N.C. 428, 76 S.E.
273 (1912).
'" Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 193 N.C. 769,
138 S.E. 143 (1927).
14 Carolina Builders Corp. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 236 N.C. 513,
73 S.E.2d 155 (1952).
.. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 193 N.C. 769,
138 S.E. 143 (1927).
- 165 N.C. 285, 81 S.E. 418 (1914).
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and material for a house and impliedly to pay for them, and since
the surety bond was executed to secure the performance of the build-
ing contract, it would then follow that the surety would be bound
to pay the unpaid claims for materials. The court declared that if
.this interpretation of the contracts had been a proper one, and if
there had been no restrictive provisions in the bond, there would
then have been no doubt of the surety's liability. However, it was
said that this was not a proper interpretation of the instruments.
The stipulation binding the contractor to furnish labor and materials
and requiring him to pay therefor was said to add no additional
liability, since a reasonable interpretation of general terms in the
agreement would require the contractor to pay such indebtedness
without any dependence upon this provision. Since the construction
agreement and surety contract must be construed together, there
could then be no basis for the extension of the surety's liability to
the payment of laborers and materialmen who had not perfected
their claims. The bond provision limiting the surety's liability to
perfected claims was said to clinch the matter. The plaintiffs, unpaid
claimants who had not perfected their liens, were not permitted to
recover on the bond.
In Guilford Lumber Mfg. Co. v. Holladay... a sectarian college
which made a contract for work upon a building on its campus was
held not to be entitled to compel the surety on the contractor's bond
to make good to the college the sum which the institution had been
,required to pay materialmen because of its failure to retain sufficient
funds, after proper notification, to satisfy their claims. The liability
here sought to be invoked was clearly outside the intended scope of
the bond. To permit a recovery in such a situation would be to
predicate the college's right of action upon its own failure to perform
a statutory duty.
The rules of good pleading require a materialman claiming under
such a surety bond to allege and prove the terms of the agreement
between the owner and the contractor, that this agreement was the
one upon which the surety bond was conditioned, that the material
furnished the contractor was used in furtherance of the particular
project involved, and that the contractor's indebtedness for this mate-
rial was due and unpaid. A complaint which failed to plead a con-
... 178 N.C. 417, 100 S.E. 597 (1919).
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struction contract or to describe the cogent provisions of such an
agreement was said to fail to state a cause of action.15
3
III. THE LIEN ON PERSONAL PROPERTY IN FAVOR
OF MECHANICS OR ARTISANS
In addition to the lien on personal property specifically mentioned
in the general mechanic's lien law,' with regard to which there
has been very little litigation or judicial comment, there is a more
frequently employed statute which authorizes a lien in favor of "any
mechanic or artisan who makes, alters or repairs any article of
personal property at the request of the owner or legal possessor of
such property."'' 55 The procedure for creating and enforcing this
lien is different from that of the general mechanic's lien. Under the
statute, G.S. § 44-2, the mechanic or artisan may retain possession of
the property in question until just and reasonable charges for his
services are paid. In the event such charges are not paid within
thirty days if the charges are under fifty dollars, or if not paid within
ninety days when the charges are over fifty dollars, the mechanic or
artisan may upon proper statutory notification, sell the property in
his possession.
To be entitled to this lien it is clear that anyone constructing some
article of personal property for another or having possession of some-
one else's chattel for the purpose of alteration or repair would be
required to retain possession of the property, since there can be no
lien after the chattel has been voluntarily and unconditionally re-
turned to the owner or other authorized person before a settlement of
the indebtedness.5
A somewhat different situation arises where the person making
the repairs regains possession of the chattel after having once re-
linquished it to the owner or lawful possessor who had ordered the
job done. Where the act of repossession was carried out without
" Carolina Builders Corp. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 236 N.C. 513, 73
S.E.2d 155 (1952).
... See I. BAsIC MECHANIC'S LIEN ON REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY,
supra.
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-2 (1950).
"' Barbre-Askew Fin., Inc. v. Thompson, 247 N.C. 143, 100 S.E.2d 381
(1957); Glazener v. Gloucester Lumber Co., 167 N.C. 676; 83 S.E. 696
(1914); Block v. Dowd, 120 N.C. 402, 27 S.E. 129 (1897). It is made
clear in these cases that if the surrender is not completely voluntary, and
unconditional, then the mechanic or artisan may regain possession by appro-
priate legal action and enforce his lien.
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this person's consent, it is clear that the lien should not be revital-
ized. 157 Furthermore, the same would be true where the chattel was
redelivered to the claimant for additional repairs, his lien then being
limited to the amount charged for the latest work. 158
This statute concerning the claims of artisans has been interpreted
to authorize a lien in favor of a mechanic who made repairs on an
automobile at the request of a chattel mortgagor in lawful possession,
the mechanic having retained possession of the vehicle. This claim
was given priority over the pre-existing mortgage. The court said
that by leaving the mortgagor in possession the mortgagee had given
an implied authorization to the mortgagor to have the repairs
made. "'59 One commentator has suggested that the mortgagee would
be in a more advantageous position, since the automobile would be
worth more with the repairs than without them.160 In another
case,'' however, the rights of a conditional vendor in a car-purchase
transaction prevailed over a repairman's claim where repairs were
ordered by a second mortgagee who had never used or had possession
of the car. The court declared that the second mortgagee was neither
an "owner" nor a "legal possessor" within the scope of the statute.
The language employed in the statute was said to cover only owners
and those persons who are in possession with their knowledge and
consent and under circumstances tending to show an express or im-
plied authority to make such repairs as may be consistent with the
contemplated use of the chattel involved.
There would appear to be no doubt that with respect to a car
or other chattel sold under a conditional sale agreement, duly re-
corded, the rights of the holder of a mechanic's lien thereafter
acquired would be inferior to the claim of conditional vendor.1 2
However, where the conditional sale agreements were not recorded
until after commercial firms had become entitled to general me-
chanics' liens for labor and material furnished in connection with
the construction of an edifice into which the appliances and equip-
1 Block v. Dowd, supra note 156.
... Barbre-Askew Fin. Co. v. Thompson, 247 N.C. 143, 100 S.E.2d 381
(1957). The court in this case declared that there could be no lien for the first
work done after possession was lost, and that the only rights the claimant had
were those growing out of contract.
"" Johnson v. Yates, 183 N.C. 24, 110 S.E. 603 (1922).
"' Note, 1 N.C.L. REv. 127 (1922).
... Willis v. Taylor, 201 N.C. 467, 160 S.E. 487 (1931).
"'Willis v. Taylor, supra note 161; cf. Fulp & Linville v. Kernersville
light & Power Co., 157 N.C. 157, 72 S.E. 867 (1911).
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ment subject to the agreements were built, thus acquiring the status
of real estate, the liens of the commercial firms were held to be
superior.1s
The artisan's lien statute can be used to protect the possession
of one who holds timber after he has cut it in accordance with an
agreement with a lumber company owning the land; but he is liable
to the owner or its legal representative where he has failed to conserve
the property and in such case may be required to return it. 64 How-
ever, a different situation is presented where an owner of standing
timber sold it to a lumber company which employeda person trained
in logging operations to cut the timber and float it by raft to the
company's mill. The vendor, after the company's default, seized
the severed timber from the logger. Although the logs were later
lost accidentally and no lien existed here, it was declared that the
logger had had a lien before the seizure and that the vendor had con-
verted the property and was liable therefor. 65 Of course the timber
became personal property after it was severed and cut into logs.
Just in passing it might be well to mention the statute 66 which
describes the circumstances and conditions under which the holder
of a mortgage, deed of trust, or conditional sale contract, executed
in some other state, on a chattel afterwards brought into North Caro-
lina, may insure the priority of his claim. Observance of the registra-
tion provisions of this statute has made it possible for such secured
creditors to protect themselves more fully against the claims of
future lienholders, including those of mechanics, laborers, and mate-
rialmen. This enactment is particularly important with respect to
the assertion of claims upon automobiles and other vehicles.
IV. LABORER'S LIEN ON LOGS AND LUMBER
Another statute 67 authorizes a lien in favor of all persons en-
gaged in cutting logs, sawing lumber, or preparing wood pulp, acid
wood, or tan bark. This lien is given priority over all other liens or
claims upon the logs or lumber with the exception of the claim of a
bona fide purchaser for full value. Specific provisions chart the
... Fulp & Linville v. Kernersville Light & Power Co., supra note 162.
"' Huntsman Bros. & Co. v. Linville River Lumber Co., 122 N.C. 583, 29
S.E. 838 (1898).
..
5 Thomas v. Merrill, 169 N.C. 623, 86 S.E. 593 (1915).
... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-38.1 (Supp. 1961).
"" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-3 (1950).
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procedure to be followed in perfecting and enforcing this lien, in-
cluding a requirement of notice to the owner.
A rather interesting case" arose concerning the interpretation to
be placed upon this statute. A lumber company employed a con-
tractor to manage a sawmill in connection with the operation of a
logging railroad. Among the workers hired were three persons;
one a laborer who took boards from the saw and placed them upon
a truck, another a mechanic who was hired to repair railway cars
and mill machinery, and the third who performed incidental repairs
upon tracks, bridges, and a trestle. All three of these employees
claimed that the statute authorized liens in their favor. The court
iuled in favor of the sawmill worker but denied the claims of the
other two. It is evident that a majority of the court believed that
the loggifig lien statute was not designed to cover services like those
performed by either of these other two employes. However the
dissenting judge's opinion that the statute should cover all essential
workers in the entire logging operation is very persuasive.
In an instance where the claimant seeking to establish this lien
was employed by a contractor in charge of a logging operation, the
court declared that he would be permitted to enforce his claim only
if the owner of the timber could be shown to be indebted to the
contractor, and then only to the extent of that indebtedness."'
V. MISCELLANY
A. Misrepresentations as to Existence of Liens
Sometimes a case may arise where there has been fraudulent con-
duct by persons making erroneous representations concerning indebt-
edness which may form the basis of claims by laborers and material-
men asserting mechanics' liens. Such conduct will often make the
'culprits criminally as well as civilly responsible. In one such case170
a criminal indictment alleged that the managers of a theatre in the
process of being repaired had falsely and feloniously represented that
all bills for labor and materials had been fully paid, and that the
prosecuting bank, acting upon the representations, loaned the de-
fendant managers a sum of money and took a mortgage which was
pretended to be a first lien upon the theatre building and the land
... Glazener v. Gloucester Lumber Co., 167 N.C. 676, 83 S.E. 696 (1914).
... Bryson v. Gennett Lumber Co., 171 N.C. 700, 89 S.E. 26 (1916).
17' State v. Howley, 220 N.C. 113, 16 S.E.2d 705 (1941).
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on which it was situated. It was stated that through the use of
this ruse the theatre managers had obtained the loan with intent
to defraud the bank and that they had thereby violated the statutes 71
which decry conduct of this sort and make it punishable as the crime
of false pretense. The court was of the opinion that the indictment
had sufficiently charged the crime and upheld the conviction.
B. Lien Claimant's Interest Not Insurable
The materialman's inchoate right to a lien has been held to be
insufficient to give him an insurable interest for the purpose of
protecting himself from loss by fire, even though the loss occurred
after the lien was actually filed.' 72 Furthermore, the holder of a
properly established mechanic's lien has been held to have no claim
upon the proceeds of an insurance policy taken out by a property
owner and made payable to himself or a mortgagee.
3
C. Interest
In one instance the question arose as to whether the claims of
subcontractors and materialmen against the amount due a contractor
from an owner were within the purview of a statute174 providing
that money due by contract shall bear interest. The court, treating
the aggregate sum due to various claimants after notice as a trust
fund to be distributed pro rata as provided by statute among the
claimants, decided that this enactment authorizing the payment of
interest was not applicable in the situation presented here. The court
stated that the owner, who had been ready and willing to pay over
to the claimants the remaining sum still in his hands and required
by agreement to be paid to the contractor, could not be held re-
sponsible for any interest payments. It was said that in situations
not within the statute providing for such charges, no interest is to be
allowed unless there has been some adequate default by the debtor
in withholding the principal sum or any part of it. The court also
declared that in such cases the payment of costs is at the discretion of
the trial judge and that it may be adjudged that costs are payable
out of the amount due.'
7 5
171-N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-100, 15-153 (1953).
""Roper v. National Fire Ins. Co., 161 N.C. 151, 76 S.E. 869 (1912).
"' Henley Ice Mach. Co. v. Green, 181 Fed. 890 (4th Cir. 1910); cf.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-15.1 (Supp. 1961), where the agricultural landlord's
lien is protected in a similar situation.
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-5 (1953).
"' Bond v. Pickett Cotton Mills, 166 N.C. 20, 81 S.E. 936 (1914).
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CONCLUSION
It may be said that the North Carolina law with respect to
mechanics' liens is fairly clear. Most of the important issues have
been raised and decided. The rights of holders of mechanics' liens as
against bona fide purchasers of property subject thereto need to be
pin-pointed and more directly stated. The profession would welcome
a little more clarity both in the statutes and judicial opinions concern-
ing the two types of these liens. Collateral rights also need to be
spelled out more fully. Yet a careful analyst may obtain an accurate
picture of the true state of the law.
